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Abstract 
Analysis of accidents in socio-technical systems frequently reveals unnoticed 
obstacles, which have grown to become the main cause of incubation and surprise at 
failure (Dekker, 2011). Thus far, it has proven to be a challenge to identify those 
unnoticed obstacles upfront among the tremendous number of events occurring 
during normal operations. In this article, we describe the usage of weak resilience 
signals (WRS) (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014), at a rail control post, to reveal obstacles 
compromising the resilience state of the system. Resilience is defined as the ability 
of a complex socio-technical system to cope with unexpected and unforeseen 
disruptions (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). The WRSs, developed and 
presented around three system boundaries: safety, performance and workload, are 
used to stimulate a state of mindfulness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) revealing 
unnoticed obstacles. An observational study is proposed to verify exposure of 
obstacles and their impact on rail-system resilience. The WRS and its stimulus to 
rail traffic controllers are expected to contribute to a higher rail operation reliability.  
Introduction 
Accident analyses of socio-technical systems expose unnoticed disturbances which 
are a component in the process towards failure (Hall, 2003; Stanton & Walker, 
2011). These disturbances are either not observed or ignored throughout the 
complex process of the system. This is not surprising since many disturbances occur 
continuously and do not evolve into an accident. Some disturbances are identified 
with a potential to evolve into an accident, but are ignored due to the culture of the 
organization (Vaughan, 1997, 2002). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) propose high-
reliability-organization principles influencing the culture of organizations to deal 
with the unexpected. They introduce the term ‘mindfulness’, split into the phases 
anticipation and containment, to work out the principles. The three principles of 
anticipation are: 1) preoccupation with failure; 2) reluctance to simplify; and 3) 
sensitivity to operations. The two additional principles of containment are: 4) 
commitment to resilience; and 5) deference to expertise. In previous research, we 
have developed weak-resilience-signals (WRS) to identify disturbances to the 
resilience state of a rail-system (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014). The WRSs are signals 
around the boundaries: safety, performance and workload, on a high aggregation 
level needing further analysis to understand the root causes. We described a method 
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to measure workload WRS and applied it at a rail control post. Analysis of the 
workload WRS identified has revealed a disturbance which we call an obstacle. The 
obstacle identified influenced the resilience of the system. Our analysis showed that 
the obstacle attracted resources and attention, which may influence the spare 
capacity needed when a disruption occurs. Although the WRS measurement has a 
clear methodology, the obstacle identification has not and was a result of ad hoc 
analysis. This was sufficient to quantify a WRS, since it proved the ability of a WRS 
to reveal an obstacle, but left a gap concerning the methodology of obstacle 
identification. The aim of this article is to fill this gap by describing a process to 
reveal obstacles systematically using WRSs as the carrier of mindfulness. 
Process to reveal obstacles with help of WRSs 
The first principle of Mindfulness, defined by Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) as “a rich 
awareness of discriminatory detail”, is preoccupation with failure. They suggest four 
questions to deal with this principle which will cause “actively searching for weak 
signals that the system is acting in unexpected ways” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 
151): 
1) What needs to go wrong?; 2) What could go wrong?; 3) How could things go 
wrong?; 4) What things have gone wrong? 
The focus is here on “wrong”, occurring repetitively in all questions, while a central 
concept of resilience is the focus on what goes right  (Hollnagel, 2009). We suggest 
to seek beyond failure to enrich Mindfulness using weak-resilience-signals (WRSs).  
The Mindfulness phase of anticipation is suitable to enrich with signals to anticipate 
on like the WRS, while the containment phase is about the way of acting and has no 
direct relation with signals. Therefore, we only adjust the three Mindfulness 
principles of anticipation, marked with underlined text, to focus on the WRS and are 
phrased as follows:  
1. Preoccupation with WRS in addition to failure; 
2. Reluctance to simplify WRS interpretations;  
3. Sensitivity to operations by being aware of WRS. 
The preoccupations with WRS, in addition to failure, can be achieved through after-
shift-review discussion of a rail traffic control team guided by questions they have to 
answer. The team has to go through a process of analysing the WRS based upon the 
activities occurring throughout its shift. For doing that, they need sensitivity to the 
operation and keep in mind operational facts to be used at the review. During the 
review they should not simplify the reasoning of the WRS but stimulate each other 
for deep reasoning and search for underlying reasons and conditions causing the 
WRS beyond their own responsibility. Once rail traffic controllers have understood 
these conditions, they have to discuss whether they can reoccur as an obstacle to 
interfere with future operations. Finally, they have to discuss how they can 
anticipate these obstacles. 
A set of after-shift-review questions will help the team to direct its discussion: 
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 Which conditions have made the WRS possible? Search deep and beyond 
your responsibility. 
 Are (some of) these conditions obstacles that may reoccur? 
 Which actions can be taken, on different levels of the system, to anticipate 
these obstacles?  
The first question causes the team to think in terms of conditions, rather than 
obstacles. They should not simplify these conditions on their relative small span of 
control, but search beyond the responsibility of the individual and the team. When 
understanding the conditions, they can progress to the second question dealing with 
potential reoccurrence. Reoccurrence is an important attribute of an obstacle in 
addition to the ability to respond to the occurrence. This ability is the core of the 
third question, dealing with anticipation. Different levels of the system can 
anticipate. Anticipation is possible on the level of the individual and the team. In this 
case, the team can agree on future actions to take. However, some anticipatory 
action can only be taken on higher levels, like the whole Post, the national control 
centre, the company or even on the national political level.  
To illustrate the above, we will take a workload WRS identified by Siegel and 
Schraagen (2014). This workload WRS presents a situation of a rail controller being 
occupied during the morning shift by continuous ad hoc shunting activities, rating 
his workload the whole morning much above the standard low workload. The 
standard low workload enables him to peak and react adequately when an 
unexpected disturbance occurs. The continuous ad hoc shunting activities may 
undermine his ability to react appropriately. A discussion of the team about this 
workload WRS, with help of the above review questions, can result in the following. 
The team identifies the condition that small train companies using the rail 
infrastructure are having difficulties to manage their equipment and react on the spot 
without planning shunting movements ahead. This situation is reoccurring and can 
be seen as an obstacle, since it occupies the spare capacity needed during calamities, 
causing a reduction in resilience. Anticipation on this obstacle is possible on 
different levels. The individual rail controller can either request his counter party to 
plan his activities ahead or refuse accepting the shunting order. The team can 
reorganise its activities to unload the specific rail controller to manage its capacity. 
The Post, being the management unit of the teams, can add resources to the team to 
bring the workload to the standard level or approach the local management of the 
train companies to search for a solution. This obstacle can also be dealt with on a 
national level, which goes beyond the direct influence of the team, but could be 
addressed by the Post management. 
The proposed process needs to be verified and prove its ability to expose obstacles, 
compromising system resilience. In the next section, we describe the design of an 
observational study at a rail control post to verify the process in a socio-technical 
rail-system. 
Observational study design at a rail control post 
The main effect to verify the proposed process is its influence on the resilience state 
of the system. Hollnagel (2009) states that resilience implies four essential system 
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capabilities, also called the four cornerstones of resilience: anticipating, responding, 
monitoring, and learning. The proposed process of using WRSs at after-shift-review 
s aims to improve 1) the learning of team performance throughout their shift and 2) 
the anticipation on the obstacles identified. In that sense, the verification should 
focus on learning and anticipation to prove the influence on the system resilience. 
However, this does not imply the resilience compromise of the obstacles identified. 
Analysis of scenarios describing the obstacle occurrence, with help of all four 
cornerstones with emphasis on responding and monitoring, can indicate the 
resilience impact of the obstacle itself. Another aspect to verify is the influence of 
the WRS itself on the whole process. In other words, what would be the result of 
conducting an after-shift-review of the events, without presenting the WRSs? We 
will address these aspects in the study design after describing the setting at the rail 
control post, where the observation takes place. 
The setting is a rail control post responsible for an area with rail stations split up into 
two main rail corridors: south-north, called corridor North, and west-east, called 
corridor East. Each of the corridors has workstations for rail controllers working in 
three shifts operating the control post 24 hours a day. Corridor North has 4 
workstations, corridor East has 3 workstations, and one workstation at the post is 
used only during calamities and can be added to each corridor. At the Post, 
approximately 70 rail controllers are authorized to work at one, more, or all of the 
workstations. During a trial period of one week, the morning shift of corridor East 
will conduct an after-shift-review discussion for an hour. The first half hour will 
concentrate on the occurrences of the day and the second half hour on WRSs as 
described in the previous section. Corridor North and the other shifts will not 
conduct an review. The review will be led by a team-leader, who is not a rail-
controller, and observed by a researcher. The researcher will take notes on the 
discussion and focus on the difference in the two half hours and on the reasoning 
trace of the obstacles. After the review, the researcher will interview each team 
member of corridor East, and of corridor North and of the next shift of corridor East 
as reference. 
The researchers will seek for evidence through interviews on the hypothesis that:        
1) the resilience of the morning shift of corridor East grows and 2) the resilience has 
grown due to the review discussion on WRSs. The first hypothesis will be tested by:    
1) an observed growth of learning and anticipation plans and 2) identification of 
obstacle scenarios influencing the four cornerstones. The findings will be 
corroborated through interviews with the target and reference teams. The second 
hypothesis will be tested through the difference between the first and second half 
hour of the review as well as with interviews with the different teams. 
Summary and discussion 
We combine in this article two theories, high-reliability-organisations and weak 
resilience signals (WRS). High-reliability-organisations underpin their qualities with 
the assumption that first, it is possible to identify and anticipate potential failure 
scenarios, and second, it is possible to spot errors when they occur and identify a 
timely and appropriate course of action in real time to avert catastrophic 
consequences (Lekka, 2011). Weak resilience signals originate by obstacles which 
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compromise system resilience but lack a systematic organisational process 
identifying the obstacles and ensuring the anticipation to prevent their incubation 
(Siegel & Schraagen, 2014). The two theories seem complementary, where the first 
concentrates on the organisation and its processes, the second focuses on 
visualization of cues, which have not been spotted or cannot be seen. However, 
evidence is needed that in reality they will strengthen each other. We proposed an 
observational study in a rail operations control room where high-reliability-
organisation principles are using weak resilience signals. The study will verify and 
challenge the hypothesis that weak-resilience-signals can reveal obstacles 
compromising rail-system resilience. A positive outcome is expected to contribute to 
a higher rail operation reliability. 
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